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Principal-agent problems are pervasive in economic settings. CEOs and shareholders, 
lawyers and clients, manufacturers and retailers, lenders and borrowers are all examples 
of settings in which moral hazard problems might arise. Incentive contracts in both 
individual and team environments have been studied by economists (see Shavell (1979) 
and Holmstrom (1982, 1979) for seminal theoretical work, and Prendergast (1999) for a 
survey of empirical literature). Contracts that tie an agent's compensation to performance, 
such as conditional bonus schemes, have been proposed as a way to align the interests of 
agents and principals. Experimental literature from economics and social psychology 
suggests that the way choices are framed can affect decisions as well. Hence, contract 
frames might influence the effectiveness of incentive schemes. This comment first 
outlines seminal experimental work on frames and describes a recent study that relates 
the incentive contract literature with the experimental work on frames. Second, it 
discusses the experimental design and findings of Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup's 
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1 Introduction
Principal-agent problems are pervasive in economic settings. CEOs and sharehold-
ers, lawyers and clients, manufacturers and retailers, lenders and borrowers are all
examples ofsettings in which moral hazard problems might arise. Incentive con-
tracts in both individual and team environments have been studied by economists
(see Shavell [1979] and Holmstrom [1982, 1979] for seminal theoretical work,
and Prendergast [1999] for a survey of empirical literature). Contracts that tie
an agent’s compensation to performance, such as conditional bonus schemes, have
been proposed as a way to align the interests ofagents and principals. Experimen-
tal literature from economics and social psychology suggests that the way choices
are framed can aﬀect decisions as well. Hence, contract frames might inﬂuence the
eﬀectiveness ofincentive schemes.
This comment is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines seminal experimental
work on frames and discusses a recent study that relates the incentive contract lit-
erature with the experimental work on frames. Section 3 discusses the experimental
design and ﬁndings of Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup’s [2011] work on
individual incentives and contract frames. Section 4 presents concluding remarks.
2 Relevant Literature
Tversky and Kahneman’s [1991] work on individual choice explores the psycho-
logical diﬀerences between gains and losses. Their ﬁndings suggest that people dis-
like losses more than they like equal-sized gains, a phenomenon called loss-aversion.
As a result, the way choices are framed (or mentally accounted for) can aﬀect the
decisions people make. Cachon and Camerer [1996] extend Tversky and
Kahneman’s [1991] work on framing to strategic decision-making environments
with multiple players. Speciﬁcally, they study the eﬀect off raming in coordination
games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, and propose a new selection principle called
1loss-avoidance. This selection principle implies that players will not choose (or ex-
pect others to choose) strategies that result in certain losses ifother (equilibrium)
strategies are available. Cachon and Camerer [1996] ﬁnd that charging a fee
to play, which renders ineﬃcient equilibria money-losing, induces coordination on
Pareto-superior equilibria. These results suggest the use ofloss-avoidance as selec-
tion principle. The authors conclude that mental accounting ofoutcomes aﬀects
choices in strategic settings by guiding players’ beliefs about the behavior of others.
More recently, Hossain and List’s [2009] work combines the economics litera-
ture on incentives with the ﬁndings on framing. Using a natural ﬁeld experiment,1
they study the eﬀects ofcontract f rames on worker productivity in both individual
and team settings. Their ﬁndings suggest that pay-for-performance compensation
schemes (conditional bonuses) framed as both losses and gains increase productiv-
ity for both individuals and teams (compared to ﬁxed-salary schemes). Note that
the observed increase in productivity under pay-for-performance schemes reﬂects
rational behavior ofindividuals and team members (because higher productivity is
associated with higher monetary payoﬀs). In addition, their ﬁndings indicate that
teams exhibit stronger responses to bonuses presented as losses than comparable
bonuses presented as gains, suggesting loss-aversion considerations. Interestingly,
the diﬀerences in productivity for the team treatments are statistically signiﬁcant
and robust to various controls, whereas the individual diﬀerences are less robust (not
statistically signiﬁcant). The authors argue that the stronger frame eﬀects among
teams might reﬂect the concern ofteam members about letting f ellow team mem-
bers down, and the inﬂuence that highly loss-averse workers (who are more vigilant
about the performance of their team members) might have on other team members.
3 Individual Incentives and Contract Frames:
Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup [2011]
Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup [2011] experimentally assess the eﬀects of
contract frames on individual performance, using a between-subject design.2 The
basic experimental conditions are as follows: a Gain Frame condition (where a bonus
is paid at the end ofthe game ifa speciﬁc target is met or exceeded) and a Loss
Frame condition (where a bonus is temporarily transferred and deducted at the end
ofthe game ifthe target is not met). Two additional conditions are explored: a
1A natural ﬁeld experiment is “one where the subjects naturally undertake [the] tasks and where
the subjects do not know that they are in an experiment” (Harrison and List [2004], p. 1014).
2The authors motivate their paper on Hossain and List’s [2009] work. Given that Hos-
sain and List’s [2009] ﬁndings do not suggest signiﬁcant eﬀects of contract frames on individual
performance, it is not clear why individual performance was selected.
2Table 1
Brooks et al.’s [2011] Numerical Example
Information Provided1 Information Not Provided2
Machine Bonus Experiment Payoﬀ3 Monetary Payoﬀ
1 NO 9000 18.0
2 NO 8000 16.0
3 YES 8700 17.4
4 YES 7500 15.0
5 YES 6500 13.0
6 YES 5500 11.0
Note: 1The information provided also included the output level and rental cost per
machine; 2experiment payoﬀ and monetary payoﬀ needed to be computed by the
subjects; 3the experiment currency was the Experiment Franc (500 Experiment
Francs = 1 Swiss Franc).
Loss Expectations condition3 and a Loss Endowment condition.4
At the beginning ofthe experimental session, the subjects are inf ormed about the
performance (output level) and rental cost of six diﬀerent machines, whether each
output level is associated with a bonus (or just a ﬁxed payment), and the monetary
value ofthe bonus and ﬁxed payment. Note that the subjects are not explicitly
provided with the payoﬀs associated with the diﬀerent machines. However, the
subjects do have suﬃcient information to calculate these payoﬀs. Subjects are then
asked to choose a speciﬁc machine.
Table 1 summarizes the numerical example used in this study. Two points de-
serve a discussion. First, the agent’s monetary payoﬀ is maximized by choosing
the least productive machine, machine 1. Hence, this choice corresponds to the
theoretical point prediction. Second, although the objective ofthe principal is not
theoretically discussed in the paper, we might infer from this numerical example
that the principal’s objective is to induce a level ofoutput that corresponds to the
choice ofmachine 3 (or higher). This is reﬂected by the lower bound f or the bonus
provision in the numerical example. Then, the economic objectives ofthe principal
and the agent are not aligned under this pay-for-performance scheme. As a result,
3Under this condition, a bonus is temporarily transferred but subjects are informed that this
transfer responds to a tax purposes only. The bonus is deducted at the end of the game if the
target is not met.
4Under this condition, a payment is temporarily transferred and deducted at the end of the
game if the target is not met. Note that the payment label is used instead of the bonus label.
3Table 2
Brooks et al.’s [2011] Findings
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6
G a i n F r a m e 5 131 6110
L o s s F r a m e 4 601 8900
L o s s E x p e c t a t i o n s 4 101 5101
L o s s E n d o w m e n t 4 601 1211
the rationale for this experimental environment is not clear.5
Next, we discuss the fundamental hypotheses explored in Brooks et al. [2011].6
First, the authors hypothesize the deviation from the point prediction (i.e., the
choice ofa machine diﬀerent f rom machine 1), across conditions. 7 Second, the au-
thors hypothesize that this deviation from the point prediction will be signiﬁcantly
stronger under the loss frame (compared to the gain frame).8 The rationale for these
hypotheses is not clearly deﬁned. The paper does not establish a relationship be-
tween these hypotheses and prior theoretical and experimental literature. Consider
the ﬁrst hypothesis. The choice ofa machine diﬀerent f rom machine 1 represents a
non-rational choice. It is unclear why, in theory, a subject would make such a choice
(see our discussion ofthe numerical example). Consider now the second hypothesis.
The authors also fail to explain why the loss frame would be more likely to induce
more non-rational behavior than the gain frame.
Table 2 summarizes the ﬁndings from this study. These ﬁndings provide support
for the theoretical point prediction (the choice of machine 1). In fact, the mode
choice (across conditions) is machine 1: 71, 63, 71, and 75% ofsubjects chose
machine 1, in the Gain Frame, Loss Frame, Loss Expectations and Loss Endowment
conditions, respectively. A few comments regarding the ﬁndings and experimental
5Although we have no objection to an experimental environment that abstracts from the pres-
ence of the principal, we do believe that an experimental study regarding pay-for-performance
incentive schemes should involve a theoretical discussion of the objective of the principal and an
alignment of the numerical examination with this theoretical framework.
6Although Brooks et al. [2011] explore other elements related to the loss frame (Loss Ex-
pectations and Loss Endowment conditions), these additional elements are relevant only in case of
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the gain and loss frames. Hence, we decided to focus our discussion
on the two basic contract frame conditions.
7In their June 2011 version of the manuscript, the authors state that“although subjects maxi-
mize their payoﬀs when choosing machine 1, they would sometimes lease other machines yielding
higher output and earning them a bonus” (Brooks et al. [2011], p. 9).
8In their June 2011 version of the manuscript, the authors indicate that “the tendency to lease
higher output machines is stronger in the loss frame than in the gain frame” (Brooks et al.
[2011], p. 10).
4design follow. First, the practice exercise, administered before the actual elicitation
ofchoices, explicitly directed the attention ofthe subjects to machine 1. 9 Then,
the mode choice ofmachine 1 might indicate that the experimental design induced
speciﬁc behavior. Second, the payoﬀs from choosing machines 1 and 3 are equal
to 9000 and 8700, respectively (18 and 17.4 Swiss Francs). The similarity between
these two payoﬀs might explain the f requency ofchoice ofmachine 3. Third, given
that the payoﬀs were not provided to the subjects (participants needed to compute
the payoﬀs from the information provided), the choices of machines diﬀerent from
machine 1 might suggest computational errors. Finally, these ﬁndings do not support
the authors claim regarding the replication of Hossain and List’s [2009] results.
Although these ﬁndings do not contradict Hossain and List [2009], they do not
conﬁrm Hossain and List [2009] either.10
4 Concluding Remarks
Experimental work from economics and social psychology suggests that framing ma-
nipulations can inﬂuence individual choice and decisions in strategic settings. Hence,
contract frames might aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of incentives schemes. Hossain and
List’s [2009] ﬁndings suggest a stronger eﬀect ofcontract f rames on group decision-
making (compared to individual decision-making). Experimental investigation of
the factors that might inﬂuence the eﬀects of contract frames on group decision-
making in strategic settings11 might complement Hossein and List’s [2009] ﬁeld
experiment. These, and other extensions, remain fruitful areas for future research.
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